Researchers looked at four different demographic scenarios (altered mean vital rates (i.e., fertility and mortality), vital rate stochasticity, vital rate covariance, and periodic catastrophes) and their possible effects on the rapid population growth of contemporary human foragers and steady population decline of chimpanzees. They evaluated these variables and the various conditions that would favor a more sustainable zero population growth (ZPG) among 10 small-scale subsistence human populations (Agta, Ache, Hadza, Hiwi, Ju/’hoansi, Gainj, Tsimane, Yanomamo, Northern Territory Aborigines, and Herero) and five wild chimpanzee groups (Gombe, Kanyawara, Mahale, Ngogo, and Taï). The results state that the most effective modifications towards ZPG would include a combination of more than one of the four demographic scenarios tested, with the most realistic solution including both vital rate alteration and an increase in catastrophes.

This article seeks to reevaluate the widespread assumption that hunter-gatherers lack the longevity that people in the modern, industrialized world enjoy. Through modeling life expectancy, mortality, and other demographic trends among extant hunter-gatherer, gatherer-horticulturalists, and horticulturalists societies they are able to challenge this belief. The authors conclude that longevity is a "novel feature of Homo sapiens" and that seven decades seems to be the natural lifespan of a human.

Grooming of conspecifics is thought to play an important social role among nonhuman primates, but the function and relative importance of such grooming among humans is unknown. Here the authors compare time spent grooming and conversing among six small-scale societies with grooming data from 69 nonhuman primate species. They test the hypothesis that conversation evolved among humans as an alternative way to obtain the social benefits (such as building and maintaining social alliances) of grooming in large groups.

This article examines whether intergenerational wealth transmission perpetuates inequality among hunter-gatherers. The authors consider three types of wealth: embodied, material, and relational. Empirical analysis of wealth transmission in five cultures suggests that, in many cases, a parent’s wealth is associated with a child’s life chances. Gini coefficients suggest that hunter-gatherer cultures have low to moderate wealth inequality overall: very low by current world standards but not non-existent.

In order to explore the evolution of mutually beneficial transactions in large societies, this experimental study gathered data on the way people in societies of different subsistence types played games simulating interactions with anonymous others. The degree of fairness displayed by different players was correlated with measures of large-scale institutions, such as a market or world religion, that were present in a player’s society. Results suggest that “modern prosociality is not solely the product of an innate psychology, but also reflects norms and institutions that have emerged over the course of human history” (1480).

This article examines the relationship between population size (and complexity) and the level of third-party punishment in economic games. Results demonstrate that people in larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment than people in small-scale societies.

This article examines marital residence and sibling coresidence among horticulturalists in the South American lowlands. The authors reject a hypothesis that patrilocality is the defining trait of Amazonian tropical forest culture. Results on horticulturalists are compared with findings on hunter-gatherers: horticulturalists tend to be more uxorilocal. Empirical analysis also suggests that women tend to live with more kin later in life, and in large villages headmen live with more kin than nonheadmen.

This study examines costly punishment behavior across cultures. Authors conducted economic games in a variety of societies and found that costly punishment behavior occurs to varied degrees across cultures. Results also suggest that altruistic behavior is associated with costly punishment behavior.

This article presents the results of economic behavior experiments conducted on members of 15 small scale societies. Although three different economic experiments were conducted, findings focus on the results of the "Ultimatum Game." The authors found that no society adhered to behavior predicted by the "selfishness axiom" which suggests that individuals will behave in a way that maximizes their own gain. Authors also discuss possible predictors of behavioral variation within and between groups.

This article explains the variation in inequality using a model in which a population's inequality depends on the extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations. Results suggest that economic systems differ substantially in the intergenerational transmission of wealth.